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TITLE OF LAND UNDER WATER IN NEW YORK
PART .
It has often been decided by the Supreme Court of the United
States and by the New York Court of Appeals that in this coun-
try the fee title of lands under navigable waters up to the high
water mark is vested in the commonwealth or state in which the
property is situated, or in its grantees' These decisions are based
upon the theory that the state or commonwealth is the logical
and legal successor in this country of the sovereign or supreme
power of Great Britain, which, before the Revolution, resided
in the Crown and Parliament, and held, in the name of the King,
the title to all public lands, including lands under water. While
it is gradually becoming recognized that the British sovereignty
over this country at the time of the Revolution did not split up
into thirteen sovereignties and pass to the so-called states, making
them "sovereign states" within a state and erecting, for the first
time in the history of the world, that impossible political anomaly
often described as a "double sovereignty", it is nevertheless true
that by the decisions of the highest court the title of lands under
navigable water is said to be vested in the state in which it is
situated, or its grantees. There is some confusion as to the
nature of this title and the xtcnt to which it may be alienated.
It will therefore be helpful to a proper understanding of the sub-
ject to ascertain exactly what happened in the transition from
colonies to republic.
The Continental Congress met prior to the Declaration of Inde-
pendence and organized as the representative of all the colonies.
This was the first organization of sovereignty in this country.
The Congress assembled in May, 1775, in Philadelphia, and ad-
journed in December, 1776. It was followed by the Congress
which met in Baltimore in December, 1776, and continued
throughout the Revolutionary War and until the Articles of Con-
1Ill. Cer. R. R. v. Illinois. 146 U. S., 387; Gibson v. U. S., 166 U. S.,
271; Cummings v. Chicago, 188 U. S., 410; N. Shore Boom Co. v. Nicomen
Boom Co., 212 U. S., 406; People v. Tibbetts, 19 N. Y., 523; Roberts v.
Baumgargen, 110 N. Y., 380; Gerard on Titles (5th Ed.), 1909; People ex.
rel. Howell v. Jessup, 160 N. Y., 256. See also Martin v. Waddell, 16 Pet.,
267; Pollard v'. Hagan, 3 How (U. S.), 212.
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federation went into operation, March 1, 1781. The Continental
Congress was a revolutionrary body representing the whole people
of the -colonifes and not any particular colony alone; it legislated
for the whole country, 4nd proclaimed to the world that the
American people had become a national state and not thirteen
separate states, when they assumed "among the Powers of the
earth, the separate and equal station to which the Laws of Nature
and of Nature's God entitle them." It was the organization of
the American State, and therefore automatically succeeded to all
the rights, powers, attributes, and property of the former sover-
eign. These logically included the title to lands under navigable
waters. The next step was the adoption of the "Articles of Con-
federation"; and when the Continental Congress went out of
existence in 1781 the organization of the American sovereign or
state also ceased to exist, for the Articles of Confederation pro-
vided only for a central government without any organization of
state or sovereignty behind it.2 This condition continued until the
adoption of the present constitution, a revolutionary document,
which created an organization of the United States as sovereign
or state, independent of the organs of government, and also pro-
vided for an organization of the sovereignty or state through in-
strumentalities of the central and local governments.3 It has been
said that a state is called a sovereign state when the supreme
power resides within itself, whether resting in A single individual,
or in a number of individuals, or in the whole body of the people.
4
It might have been more accurately'said that there is no state
without this supreme or sovereign power, and that the political
organization which exists without it is merely government by
whatever name it is called. This leads us to inquire if this
supreme power resides in any of the states of the Union? It
seems not; and it is difficult to see how any of them can claim to
be sovereign or to have succeeded as matter of right by virtue of
the Revolution to the rights, privileges and property of the for-
mer sovereign. It follows, therefore, that the sovereign or su-
preme power, undoubtedly was and is, in the United States and
not in any one or more of the "States", for the reason that there
cannot be more than one sovereign or supreme power or dominion
2 Burgess, Polit. Sci. and Const. Law, Vol. 1, 100, 101, 243.
3 Garner and Lodge, Histbry U. S., II, 595; Burgess, Polit. Sci. and
Const. Law, Vol. I, 101 et seq. and 142 et seq; Const. U. S., Art. V.
4 Cooley, Const. Lim., 4th Ed., 1.
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in any single jurisdiction; and that power, as we have seen, was
in, and was assumed and exercised by, the people of the United
States as a whole when they assembled in the constituent conven-
tion, framed the Constitution and directed its adoption by revolu-
tionary procedure and provided therein for the continuing exist-
ence of the organization of the state or sovereign back of the
United States government. Furthermore, no one colony had the
strength to gain its freedom. It was the force of all the people
of the colonies that made us independent, and we are not, never
were, and never shall be as long as the Constitution lasts, a union
or confederation of states, but we are now and always have been
a nation, or better still, a popular state, "one and inseparable",
organized in the Constitution back of and superior to all local and
general governments within our boundaries.
Consequently, whatever rights, privileges, power and property,
including the title of lands under navigable water, and riparian
rights generally, which remained in the King as an attribute of
sovereignty at the time of the Revolution logically should have
passed to the United States as the sovereign power in this coun-
try. This reasoning with respect to land titles has not been fol-
lowed by the courts, which have uniformly held that the title of
lands under tide waters,-the jus privatum, as it is called,-- is in
the state or its grantees, as the successor of the British sovereign,
except where it had been granted before the Revolution to towns
or individuals by royal grants or colonial charters or patents,
5
and not in the United States. This ruling does not seem ever to
have been questioned by the United States government and pos-
sibly could be justified under the Constitution itself upon the
theory that the ownership and right to grant land under water
was one of the reserved rights and powers of the states referred
to in the Tenth Amendment, but none of the decisions has bzen
based upon this ground. In deciding the case 6f Martin v. Wad-
dell (16 Pet., 367), the Court said:
"And when the people of New Jersey took possession of the
reins of government and took into their own hands the powers
of sovereignty, the prerogatives and regalities which before be-
5 See Trustees'of Brookhaven v. Strong, 60 N. Y., 56; De Lancey v.
Piepgras, 138 N. Y., 26; Trustees of Brookhaven v. Smith, 188 N. Y., 74;
Lewis Blue Point Oyster Co. v. Briggs, 198 N. Y., 287, 229 U. S., 82; Tif-
fany v. Town of Oyster Bay, 209 N. Y., 1; Lowndes v. Huntington, 153
U. S., 1.
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longed either to the crown or the parliament, became immediately
vested in the state."
So in Pollard v. Hagan (3 How., 212), involving the title of
land under water in Alabama ceded to the United States by
Spain, which had been granted to an individual by patent from the
United States, the decision states:
"It was insisted that the United States had, under the treaty,
succeeded to all the rights and powers of the King of Spain; and
as by the laws of Spain, the King had the right to grant to a sub-
ject the soil under navigable waters, that therefore the United
States had the right to grant the land in controversy, and thereby
the plaintiffs acquired a complete title. If it were true that the
United States acquired the whole of Alabama from Spain, no
such consequences would result as those contended for. It can-
not be admitted that the King of Spain could, by treaty or other-
wise, impart to the United States any of his royal prerogatives;
and much less can it be admitted that they have capacity to re-
ceive or power to exercise them. Every nation acquiring terri-
tory by treaty or otherwise must hold it subject to those of the
government ceding it."
While not quarrelling with the results of these two decisions
that grants of land under water must emanate from the state,-
presuming it could have been more logically decided that the "re-
served powers" clause gives the state government power to make
such grants, that by the continued exercise of such power it has
become a settled rule of property that they have the right to make
them, and that as a matter of convenience it is probably best that
they should have such right,-it seems that the Court shared the
common error of so many who fail to distinguish beween state
and government. Louis XIV knew what he was tlaking about
when he said, "L'tat, c'est moi." He recognized that there was
a power superior to the government and claimed that he was that
power. In the United States the sovereignty is in the people of
the United States;- they are the state, the sovereign, and, by the
United States Constitution, they have delegated and enumerated
certain powers to the general government and left all the remain-
ing governmental powers to the local governments. John W.
Burgess in his work on Political Science and Constitutional Law,
(Vol. 2, p. 7,) says: "This appears to many minds like a resid-
uary sovereignty in the local organizations. It requires patient
reflection and successful discrimination'to attain a point of view
from which it is clearly seen that there can be no such thing as a
residuary sovereignty; that sovereignty is entire or not at all;
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and that what is left by the state to the local organizations in this
matter of distribution, is only the residuary powers of govern-
ment. * * * It requires more than superficial thinking to reach the
principle that sovereignty cannot be partly here and partly there.
but is a unit undivided and indivisible." If this t!:eory is cor-
rect, then it was a case of one sovereign treating with another
through representatives duly accredited in accordance with the
Constitution when the King of Spain ceded Alabama to the
United States, and the royal prerogatives and property passed to
and became vested in the other sovereignty which was and is the
people of the United States-the nation-and not the people of
any state or commonwealth, who, only had such governmental
powers over such property as the United States Constitution or
custom and usage permitted them to exercise. When the court
said: "Every nation acquiring territory by treaty or otherwise
must hold it subject to the Constitution * * * of its own govern-
ment" it endeavored to state a self evident proposition, but its
error lay in supposing that the Constitution is the creature of the
government, whereas the reverse. is the case. The Constitution
is the word of the sovereign, the creator of the government; and
to say that the people of a state or commonwealth are sovereign
is equivalent to saying that a state constitution is superior to the
United States Constitution. Pomeroy in his "Introduction to
the Constitutional Law of the United States" (3d ed., p. 100),
says: "The quality of sovereignty is denied to these local com-
munities; the term 'sovereign states',. I deem to be illogical, ab-
surd, opposed to the truth.of history." When he here speaks of
"sovereign states" he is of course referring to -the so-called states
of the Union.
The "reserved powers" clause merely gives to the states a
power of attorney to do all such acts of local government for
the people as were not delegated by them in the Constitution to
the United States, Government; and in this view, as plainly indi-
cated by Art. IV, the state governments are merely the local
agents of the whole people of the nation, to govern and carry out
in their particular localities the will of the sovereign as ex-
pressed in the United States Constitution, the United States Gov-
ernment being the general agent, and this agency, or any part of
it including the court-given right of state governments to grant
land under water, could be revoked at any time by the people
through an amendment of the United States Constitution. On
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the other hand, although it has never assumed to make grants of
land under water, the United States Government under the clause
permitting Congress to regulate commerce6 has assumed supreme
control of all tide waters and the land thereunder, for the purpose
of improving navigation and regulating commerce; has fixed the
lines of bulkheads and piers, the lines of solid filling, dredged
channels and otherwise regulated the manner in which the shore
front property of the riparian owner could be used and enjoyed;
and in fact has acted as if this power to regulate the use of tidal
waters as common highway for the purpose of commerce and
navigation,--the jus publicum,-which extends to the control of
the land under water also, was vested in the United States. Thus
we have by 'virtue of the Court decisions, a divided title to the
lands under water, the jus privatum, or fee, being in the state or
commohwealth or its grantees" and the jus publicum, or the right
to use and enjoy it for the purposes of commerce or navigation
being in the United States.8 As the United States is the sole
judge of the necessity of using or taking the jus privatum for the
purposes of commerce or navigation, it amounts to this: that the
United States may appropriate this property of the state or its
grantees whenever it sees fit to do so, without compensation.9
This power has also been exercised by the state or commonwealth,
and'has been said to be inalienable in the state or commonwealth ;1o
but if it was inalienable in the state how could it have passed to
the United States? It is plain that the absurdities of this position
and the inconsistencies and confusion in the decisions become
more apparent the deeper we go into this subject. The true
theory seems to be as indicated above, that the "state" or com-
monwealth never legally succeeded to the title to land under nav-
igable water, whether jus privatum or jus publicum, what-
6 U. S. Const., Art. 1, sec. 8, par. 3.
7 People v. Tibbetts, 19 N. Y., 523; Roberts v. Baumgarten, 110 N. Y.,
380, and cases in following notes.
U. S., 161; Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co. v. United States, 229 U. S.,
53, and cases cited ; People v. Staten Is. Ferry Co., 68 N. Y., 71-77; Lewis
Blue Point Oyster Co. v. Briggs, 198 N. Y., 287, affd. 33 Sup. Ct. R.
(U. S.), 697, 229 U. S., 82.
8 U. S. Constitution, Art. 1, sec. 8, par. 3; Scranton v. Wheeler, 179
9 Sage v. Mayor, 154 N. Y., 61; Slingerland v. International C. Co.,
169 N. Y., 60; Coxe v. State, 144 N. Y., 408; Lewis Blue Point Oyster Co.
v. Briggs, ante.
10 Bedlow v. N. Y. F. D. Dock Co., 112 N. Y., 263.
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ever those terms may have been construed to mean; but that the
whole title to such land became vested in the people of the United
States as the only sovereign power in this country and the suc-
cessor-to the sovereignty after the Revolution, and that by the
Constitution, as the last word of the sovereign, the control over
sftch land was delegated by the United States to Congress, its
governmental agent, with full power to use and dispose of it
for the purpose of regulating commerce; and, further, that under
the reserved powers clause of the Tenth Amendment of the Con-
stitution the "state" or commonwealth, as a local governmental
agency, has the same power to use and dispose of it, subject only
to the superior power of the United States through Congress to
use and dispose of it for the regulation of commerce. This para-
mounit authority has been generally recognized by the states, and
the attorney general of New York has held in an official opinion
that while the title of land under the Hudson River is-in the
state there is no authority in the state to interfere with the
national government in the work of improving that river for the
purposes of comnierce. 11 Thus Congress may authorize, without
compensation, the prevention of the building of bulkheads and
piers and other obstructions, 2 the curtailment of the riparian
owner's right of access to the navigable water, and the destruction
or removal of private improvements which interfere with navi-
gatibn;13 such interference, however, being permitted only for.
the purpose bf regulating commerce or navigation.'
4 But the
highest courts, which, as stated before, have ruled that the state
owned the fee title, have also held that it did not give the state
the right to grant the absolute or fee title to such lands on the
ground that the state only holds such lands in trust for the public
and cannot part with its control thereof for the purposes of the
trust,
"I Opinions Atty.-Genl., 1894, p. 382, and cases cited.
l2People v. Vanderbilt, 26 N. Y., 287, 28 N. Y., 396.
s Sage v. Mayor, 154 N. Y., 61; Scranton v. Wheeler, 179 U. S., 161;
Gerard, Titles to Real Est., 5th Ed., pp. 935, 938, 939, 943; Gould, Law of
Waters, 3rd Ed., pp. 78, 251, 273; Slingerland v. International Contr. Co.,
169 N. Y., 60; Lewis Blue Point Oyster Co. v. Briggs, 198 N. Y., 287, affd.
U. S. Sup. Court, 33 Sup. Ct. R., 679, 229 U. S., 82^ (incidental destruction
of oyster beds by dredging deep water channel); Chandler-Dunbar Water
Power Co. v. United States, 229 U. S., 53.
14 Matter City of New York, 168 N. Y., 134.
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"except as to such parcels as are used in promoting the interests
of the public therein, or can be disposed of without any substan-
tial impairment of the public in the lands and water remaining."'-5
The conclusion would seem to be then that a grant of lands
under navigable waters below high water mark from the state
or commonwealth is not good as against the United States if at
any time the United States should decide to use such lands for
the purpose of regulating commerce. At least, this is so, as long
as the land is covered with water. On the other hand, on this
theory of the paramount title of the United States, a grant from
the United States, if necessary for the proper regulation of com-
merce, under authority of an act of Congress would convey a
good title and extinguish all other rights. This method, however,
has never been followed, arid we must therefore inquire as to the
nature of the title obtained from the various forms of grants
used by the state in conveying these lands.
PART II.
State grants should be considered historically,, having in view
the various acts of the legislature upon the subject as well as the
decisions of the courts. The first legislation in New York
affecting the subject was the act passed October 22, 1779, Ch. 25,
L. 1779, sec. 13 (1 Jones and Varick 44), which assumed to trans-
fer the seigniory of all. lands, escheats, etc., which were on July
9, 1776, vested in King, of Great Britain to the people of the
"state". This was followed by a statute relating to the Commis-
sioners of the Land Office, passed May 5, 1786, Ch. 67 L. 1786,
and by Ch.. 69 L. 1801, Ch. 74 L. 1813, sec. 14, and Vol. 1, R. L.
292,. which enacted that "it shall be lawful for the said commis-
sioners to grant so much of the lands under the water of naviga-
ble rivers as they shall deem necessary to promote the commerce
of this state; provided always, that no such grant shall be made
to -any person whatever, other than the proprietor or proprietors
of the adjacent lands", and was substantially the same as R. S.
(1830) p. 208, sec. 67, excepting that the word "lakes" was there
added. By an amendment by Ch. 199 L. 1815, sec. 1, the powers
of the commissioners were extended to authorize grants of land
under water of navigable lakes and lands under water surrounding
Staten Island,
15 Ill. Cen. R. R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U. S., at 444, 445; Coxe v. State,
146 N. Y., 408; People ex rel. Howell v. Jessup, 160 N. Y., 256.
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"provided no grant to be made in pursuance hereof shall inter-
fere with any rights of the corporation of the City of New York,
nor extend more than five hundred feet into the water from low
water mark."
Similar provisions were incorporated into the Revised Statutes
of 1830, R. S. 208, sec. 67, with the further addition that such a
grant made to any person other than the owner of the adjacent
upland should be void. This was amended by Chapter 232 of the
Laws of 1835, which extended the powers of the commissioners
to lands under water, and between high and low water mark in,
and adjacent to, and surrounding Long Island and that .part of
Westchester County lying on the East River or Long Island
Sound. Section 2 of said act also provided:
"This act or the act referred to in the preceding section shall
confer upon the said Commissioners no other power than to
authorize the erection of such dock or docks, as they shall deem
necessary to promote the commerce of this state and the collection
of reasonable and accustomed dockage from persons using such
dock or docks, and the legislature may at.any time regulate the
same in such manner as they shall think proper!'
Section 3 of the same act repeals "so much of article fourth of
title fifth of chapter ninth of part one of the Revised Statutes as-is
inconsistent with this act."
It is apparent therefore that under the Revised Statutes of
1830 as amended by chapter 232, Laws 1835, the Commissioners
of the Land Office had no power to make or authorize any grants
of land under water, but had only the power to authorize the
erection of docks to promote commerce, and this power, or fran-
chise, could be given to the owner of the adjacent upland only.
The same limitations were incorporated in the second, third,
fourth, fifth and sixth editions 6f the Revised Statutes and in the
seventh and eighth editions the Act of 1835, chapter 232, is in-
cluded and reprinted in full. The said limitations were in force
until the passage of the Public Lands Law, Chapter 317, Laws
1894, on April 4, 1894, when the act of 1835 was repealed. The
statute was also amended by Chap. 283, L. 1850, which gave the
Commissioners of the Land Office "power to grant in perpetuity
or otherwise so much of the lands under the waters of navigable
rivers or lakes as they shall deem necessary to promote the com-
merce of this state, or proper for the purpose of beneficial enjoy-
ment of the same by the adjacent owner, but no such grant shall
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be made to any other person than the proprietor of the adjacent
lands, and any such grant that shall be made to any other person
shall be void." The second section of this act extended the power
to grant lands under water in, adjacent to and surrounding Long
Island and all that part of Westchester County on- the East. or
Hudson River or Long Island Sound, limited such grants to the
exterior water line established by law and excepted lands under
water belonging to the City of New York and the rights of the
Hudson River Railroad Company. As stated before, the Revised
Statutes of 1852, fourth edition and subsequent editions, con-
tained the same limitation upon the powers of the commissioners;
and it would seem, therefore, that between the enactment of
chapter 232 of the Laws of 1835 and'the Public Land Law in
1894 the Commissioners of the Land Office had no power to
authorize grants of land under water which would convey a fee
title to such lands. Prior to 1835 it seems to have been otherwise, for
the attorney-general, in an official opinion, Senate Document
No. 45, 1832, states that "grants of land under water have uii-
formly been made without pecuniary consideration, or any other
advantage to the state than such as should result from the pro-
motion of commerce. The letters patent issued in such cases
have been in the form usually employed for conveying an estate
in fee, and with few exceptions contained no condition or reser-
vation." In 1891 Attorney-General Tabor, in construing the
meaning of the phrases "purposes of commerce" and, "beneficial
enjoyment" in the act of 1850, Ch. 283, held that the legislature
meant by the latter phrase to authorize the conveyance of a fee
"where the land granted 'vas not necessary for the purposes of
commerce." It does not appear, however, that he considered the
limitations placed upon the powers of the commissioners by the
earlier act of 1835 which were then operative, said act not having
been repealed until Ch. 317 L. 1894 went into effect. (See Re-
ports Attorney-General, 1891, p. 273.) He seems to assume, if
the land granted was "necessary for the purposes of commerce",
-presumbly by the state or public,--that the beneficial enjoy-
ment" grant would not convey a fee title; but as nearly all of
these grants, especially about the City of New York, are of prop-
erty which is constantly in use "for the purposes of commerce",
and upon which valuable docks, piers and warehouses have been
built, and as in nearly every instance the very reason for obtain-
ing the grant is the necessity of erecting upon the land under
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water these aids to commerce and of using the land for the pur-
poses of commerce, the position taken appears to be a little in-
consistent. Is it not more likely that the legislature by the Act
of 1850, Ch. 283, intended by the use of the words "beneficial
enjoyment" that such a grant should only relieve the grantee
from the supervision and control of the legislature in the regula-
tion of the collection of dockage, to which by law he would be
subject under the other form of grant, and not to divest the state
of title; so that the effect of such a grant would be that the
grantee could have, hold and enjoy the land included in it exclu-
sively without interference from the legislature until such time as
the public interests require that the state, for the purposes of
commerce, should reclaim the land? It would seem so, especially
as the limitation upon the powers of the commissioners was con-
tinued as sections 84 and 85, Vol. 1, R. S. (4th Ed.), p. 451, pub-
lished in 1852, and subsequent editions down to the act of 1894,
when it was repealed. He alse states that in grants for the pur-
poses of commerce only a nominal sum has been charged whereas
in grants for beneficial enjoyment the full appraised value has been
required. Many local and special acts have been passed relating
to this subject. Among them Ch. 156 L. 1848 and Ch. 313 L.
1850, giving the owners of certain uplands the right to fill in, and
it has been held that when this was done it was an artificial ac-
crtion and a gain to the owner of the upland, and that there
remained no public easement in the filled-in land, Wetmore v.
The Atlantic White Lead Co., 37 Barb., 70; but these acts were
claimed to be unconstitutional and void because not passed by a
two-thirds vote in Wetmore v. Brooklyn Gas Light Co., 42 N. Y.,
384. The question, however, was not decided, the court merely
holding that the owner's title could not be questioned by any one
but the state, and that the public could not land at his dock with-
out permission.
Another local and special act was Ch. 184 L. 1851, which per-
mitted owners of lands fronting en the water in the Sixth,
Eighth and Tenth Wards of the City of Brooklyn to construct
wharves, bulkheads, piers and basins on the land under water in
front of their lands and to charge wharfage. This act merely
conferred a license or franchise upon the persons who complied
with its terms.
By Ch. 121 L. 1855, sec. 2, the Commissioners of the Land
Office were prohibited from making any grants of land under
YALE LAW JOURNAL
water in respect of which the Harbor Commissioners of the Port
of New York were by said act required to report, but this pro-
hibition was repealed by Ch. 360 L. 1858.
Many other and private bills have been passed by the legisla-
ture affecting lands under water, such as bills, establishing bulk-
heads, and lines of solid filling; confirming earlier patents, and
in some cases specifically conferring the title of such lands upon
compliance with the terms of the act. All of these laws must be
considered with reference to the particular facts in each case.
For instance, some of these laws purport to confirm patents
which had been granted "for the purpose of commerce" only and
to enlarge them into titles in fee simple, and this has been done
even where the terms of the original grant had not been complied
with; others attempt to confer title upon parties holding under
patents which were made to persons other than the owners of
the adjacent upland, or upon parties holding under a specified
grant, although the terms of the grant had not been complied
with and the upland title had been severed from the title of the
land under water, as where the grantee from the state having
acquired his patent of the land under water adjacent to his upland
never attempted to comply with its terms, but conveyed his up-
land with part of the adjacent land under water to one party and
later conveyed the balance included in his patent to another. In
such a case the first party who had obtained the conveyance of
the upland, under the decisions, would be the only one entitled to
receive a confirmatory patent or the benefits of remedial legisla-
tion, for the reason that all riparian rights are incident to riparian
ownership and pass with such ownership and cannot be severed
from it. (Ill. Cen. R. R. v. Illinois, 146 U. S., 444; Yates v. Mil-
wuakee, 10 Wall, 497; Archibald v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. Co., 157
N. Y., 574, 579; Inter City Realty Co. v. Newman, 128 App. Div.,
195, 198; B. M. Co. v. P. S. I. Works, 129 N. Y., 155; Chaplain
v. Valentine, 19 Barb., 484; People ex iel Blakeslee v. Commis-
sioners, 135 N. Y., 447; Matter of City of Buffalo, 206 N. Y.,
319, 331, 338.) These confirmatory acts of the legislature should
be scrutinized closely with a full view of all the facts relating to
the upland title, for many of them undoubtedly have been passed
without proper investigatien and merely for the purpose of bols-
tering up a title known to be worthless. Bearing in mind that
there is no authority, either at common law or by statute, in the
legislature to make grants of land under water to anyone except
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the owner of the adjacent upland which would interfere with his
access to the water, and that no consideration passes. to the state
for these confirmatory laws, it is difficult to see how they could
be sustained or, at least, inure to the benefit of anyone but the
owner of the adjacent upland. The legislature has no more
power to give away land under water belonging to the state than
it has to give away the Capitol at Albany. If, however, the party
claiming the benefit of the act is the upland owner or one entitled
to succeed to his interest in the land under water and the act im-
poses conditions upon him to be performed, such as filling in or
building docks, then his title would be upheld, upon compliance
with the conditions, under the doctrine laid down in Wetmore v.
Atlantic White Lead Co., 37 Barb., 70; Wetmore v. Brooklyn Gas
Light Co., 42 N. Y., 384; Steers v. Brooklyn, 101 N. Y., 51, and
Williams v. MAayor, 105 N. Y., 419, provided always that the act
complies with the constitutional restrictions that every bill appro-
priating money or property for a local or private purpose must
be passed by a two-thirds vote, and, contain in its title a brief
statement of its object. Johnson v. Spicer, 107 N. Y., 185, 202,
203 ;McCabe v. Kenney, 52 Hun., 514; Kelly v. Pratt, 41 Miscl.,
31, 35; Secs. 16 and 20, Art. 3, Constitution.) Also, it would
seem, under the doctrine of "artificial accretion" laid down in
Wetmore v. Atlantic White Lead Co., above cited, that where the
owner of the upland, having a grant from the state of the adja-
cent land under water, partially complies with the conditions of
his grant by filling in a portion of the land under water and then
conveys the upland with a part of the filled-in land, retaining a
strip of the made land along the new high water mark, he or his
subsequent grantee would be in a position as an upland owner to
apply for a confirmatory grant from the n~w high water mark
out to the bulkhead line, or to receive the benefit as an upland
owner of a confirmatory act of the legislature. See also Williams
v. Mayor, above cited, and Bedlow v. N. Y. Floating Dry Dock
Co., 112 N. Y., 263. If, however, the filling by the upland owner
had been done without the authority of a patent or an act of the
legislature it would be a mere nuisance and no title to the land
filled in would have been acquired. Sanders v. N. Y. C. & H.
R. R. Co., 144 N. Y., 75; People ex rel Blakesley v. Comm-s-
sioners, 135 N. Y., 447; People v. D. & H. Co., 75 Miscl., 322;
People v. Vanderbilt, 26 N. Y., 287; People v. N. Y. & S. I. Ferry
Co., 68 N. Y., 71; People v. Vanderbilt, 18 N. Y., 396. Conse-
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quently, where the filling was without authority, a conveyance of
the upland with a part of the filled-in land not extending to the
water would give to the grantee all of the riparian rights appur-
tenant to the upland owner, including the right to apply for a
patentof the land under water from the original high water mark
out to the bulkhead line, or r.ceive the benefits as upland owner
of any acts of the legislature relating to such land under water,
and the grantor would retain no interest in the .strip of made land
along the water, although he expressly reserved it or the bounds
of his description did not include it. This is upon the theory that
the riparian owner cannot sever his riparian rights from the
upland, and that land filled in without authority still remains land
under water as between him and the state. Sanders v. N. Y. C.
& H. R. R. Co., 144 N. Y., 75; People ex rel Blakeslee v. Com-
missioners, 135 N. Y., 447; People v. D. & H. Co., 75 Miscl., 322;
Burbank v. Fay, 65 N. Y., 57. The Public Lands Law, Ch. 317
L. 1894, Ch. 46 Consolidated Laws, embodies the powers of the
Commissioners of the Land Office, and the charter of the City
of New York grants to the city land under water embraced by
projected streets in public use or which may hereafter be opened
for public use. Matter of McClellan, 146 App., 594. It has
also been claimed that certain colonial charters vested the title
of lands under water within their boundaries in the towns or
cities to which they were granted to the exclusion of any title in
the state. Thus it has been claimed that under the charters of
Brookhaven, Hempstead, Huntington, Gravesend, Flatlands, Flat-
bush and Bushwick the lands under water in Port Jefferson Bay,
Hempstead Harbor, Huntington Harbor, Gravesend, Sheepshead
and Jamaica Bays and Bushwick Inlet were granted to the towns.
(See People v. Schermerhorn, 19 Barb., 540; Town of Brook-
haven v. Strong, 60 N. Y., 56; People v. Jessup, 160 N. Y., 249;
Sandiford v. Town of Hempstead, 186 N. Y., 554; Southamp-
ton v. Mecox Bay 0. Co., 116 N. Y., 1; Lowndes v. Huntington,
153 U. S., 1; Oelsner v. Nassau L. & P. Co., 134 App., 281; Town
of Brookhaven v. Dyett, etc. Co., 75 Miscl., 311; but see, contra
as to Jamaica Bay, Rockaway Park Imp't. Co. v. City of New
York, 140 App. Div., 160.) The City of New York has now suc-
ceeded to the rights of such of these towns as lie within its limits
and by Ch. 568 L. 1909 has acquired the state's title to the lands
under water in Jamaica Bay upon certain conditions. It is often
difficult to define the exact limits of the boundaries of these colon-
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ial charters, especially so in Gravesend Bay, and the safest course
is to require title to be made both from the state and town or city.
PART 1II.
The manner in which letters patent in the state of New York
have heretofore been executed is also open to criticism. In the
year 1803 the Governor of the state was a member of the Com-
missioners of the Land Office (see Ch. 67 L. 1786, I Green., 280),
and by Ch. 42 L. 1791, sec. 2, he was expressly authorized to
"issue" letters patent for certain unappropriated lands, excepting
"the lands in the southern district of this state" and certain other
lands, and these acts do not seem to have been expressly repealed
(Unconsolidated Laws, Vol. 1, pp. 15, 46). He presided at the
meetings of the board, but by Ch. 88 L. 1803, p. 399, he was re-
lieved from that duty by a provision that in his absence at any
meeting the commissioners should appoint a chairman, "provided,
always: That the consent and approbation of the person admin-
istering the government of this state shall be and hereby is de-
clared to be necessary to the validity of every act and proceeding
of the said land office". By Ch. XI L. 1814, sec. V (p. 10), it
was declared that thereafter it should not be necessary for the
person administering the government to attend any meetings of
the commissioners and that thereafter the officer first named in
the act amended and attending should preside, but the consent
and approbation of the Governor still remained as an essential
to the "validity of every act and proceeding of said land office".
Since this enactment in 1814, however, the records of the board
show that the minutes have not borne the approval of the Gov-
ernor, which was customary before that date, and the Governor
has not since then acted as a member of the board, although he
continued to sign and execute letters patent as evidence of his
approval, the statute requiring his approval not having been re-
pealed until February 17, 1909, when it was specifically repealed
in the Schedule of Laws Repealed at the end of the Public Lands
Law, Consolidated Laws, Ann. Ed., pp. 4604 and 4614. The
strange thing about this is that since 1894 the law, in addition to
giving the commissioners power to make grants, specifically pro-
vided that the commissioners may execute conveyances; and, as
all authorities agree that in conveyancing the word "execute"
means to sign, seal and deliver, it would seem that letters patent,
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since that date, and possibly from the time the Governor was re-
moved from the board by the Constitution of 1846 (Art. V, sec.
5), should properly have been signed by all or at least a quorum
of the board instead of by the Governor. It was not until 1907,
however, that it occurred to any Governor that it was a queer
proceeding to ask him to sign patents issued by a board of which
he was not a member. Possibly they believed prior to that date
that they were "sovereign governors" exercising the royal pre-
rogatives of their "sovereign state" in executing grants of state
lands contrary to law; but in 1907 there was an awakening when
Governor Hughes refused to sign letters patent on the ground
that he should not be required to endorse the proceedings of a
board of which he was not a member. It will be remembered that
the Governor had been excused by law from attending the meet-
ings of the board as early as 1814; and the Constitution of 1846
provided that "the lieutenant-governor, speaker of the assembly,
secretary of state, comptroller, treasurer, attorney-general and
state engineer and surveyor shall be the commissioners of the
land office"; but it had been customery for the Governor to exe-
cute these patents. When Governor Hughes took the position
that he was not charged with the duty of executing letters patent,
the land board applied to Attorney-General Jackson for advice,
and in an interesting opinion (Report of Atty.-Gen'l., 1907, p.
635) was told that the "consent or approval of the Governor is
no longer required to give validity to such acts, and the Act of
1803", above quoted, "must be deemed repealed by implication",
and that "it is undoubtedly within the power of the commis-
sioners of the land office at this time to change the form of let-
ters patent and to authorize one of their number to execute or
subscribe the same". The board then passed a resolution author-
izing the lieutenant-governor to sign all letters patent. This
leads us to inquire, when did the repeal by implication of the Act
of 1803 requiring the Governor's "consent and *approbation" take
effect? Surely it was not when Governor Hughes refused to sign.
Was it at the time of the enactment of the Public Lands Law in
1894, which repealed all of Part 1, Ch. IX, title 5, R. S., except
secs. 15, 54 and 76, or, before that time, when the Governor was
first definitely removed from the board? If so what becomes of
grants signed by the Governor since the repeal by implication took
effect and the Governor's consent was no longer necessary to the
validity of a grant? This is especially interesting with respect to
water grants where the state might claim that conditions were
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not carried out and would be permitted to take advantage of any
defects on the ground that grants by the state are construed
strictly against the grantee, who deals with a public board at his
peril, and must look well to their powers and the validity of their
proceedings. (Throop on Public Officers, secs. 105, 106, 110.)
Also, if the Act of 1803 was not repealed by implication, what
effect will it have on letters patent issued without the Goverm
approval between 1907 and the date when it was expressly re-
pealed by the Consolidated Laws? Will the court hold these
grants void?
The remaining questions involve the legality of the present
method of executing patents by the lieutenant-governor alone in
face of the express provision of the statute that the commis-
sioners execute the conveyance. The only ground upon which
this can be upheld is that the essential act is the resolution of the
board to make the grant and its passage by the secretary of state,
and that the execution of the grant is a mere ministerial act which
the board may delegate to one of its members. This is not a
strict compliance with the law, however, and it might well be
questioned whether the grantee acquires a marketable title, on
the ground that the commissioners are constitutional officers and
art acting as trustees and must act strictly in accordance with
statute, and cannot delegate their powers to one of their number.
Sec. 2, Part 1, Ch. IX, title 5, R. S., provided that, "All the
powers. now vested- or hereafter to be vested in the commis-
sioners, may be executed by a majority of the board, or by any
three of them, if the surveyor-general be one of such three".
Does not this section apply to the signing of letters patent? This
was repealed by the Public Lands Law, October 1, 1894, Ch. 317
L. 1894, which provided that three members of the board, includ-
ing the state engineer or in his absence, a majority of the com-
missioners, shall constitute a quorum, but there is no provision
whatever regarding the right to delegate the powers of the com-
missioners to. execute grants per secs. 62 and 70, to one or more
of their number, much less to an officer who was not a member of
the board, as was formerly done, unless it can be inferred from
section 4, which is as follows: "Letters patent; form and con-
tents.-All letters patent shall be in such form as the commis-
sioners direct, and contain an exception and reservation, of all
gold and silver mines." This is rather far-fetched, however, as
this section relates solely to the form of the letters patent and
not to the manner of their execution, especially so in view of the
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provisions of sections 62 and 70, authorizing the commissioners
to "execute" and "grant", and the further fact that before the
Public Lands Law, by section 38 and other sections of Part 1,
Ch. IX, title 5, R. S., it seems to have been contemplated that
the commissioners should "issue" such grants. Moreover there
was never any resolution of the land board authorizing the Gov-
ernor to execute grants.
Following is the letter of Governor Hughes presented at a
meeting of the Commissioners of the Land Office, Decem-
ber 19, 1907, by the lieutenant-governor, which will be found at
p. 231 of Proceedings Commissioners of Land Office, 1907:
"State of New York, Executive Chamber,
"Albany, December 19, 1907.
"To the Commisioners of the Land Office, Albany, N. Y.
"Sirs :-It has been the practice of the Commissioners of the
Land Office to present to the Governor for execution on behalf
of the state the various grants which they decide should be made.
The Governor, however, is not one of the Commissioners of the
Land Office, and no authority is vested in him by the Constitution
or the statutes to pass upon the merits of any application for the
grant of lands or rights in land, or to approve or disapprove the
transactions of the Commissioners.
"It seems to me advisable, therefore, that the Commissioners
of the Land Office shbuld make such provision for the execution
of their grants as will make it unnecessary for the Governor to
execute them. In saying this, I do not desire to be understood
as expressing disapproval of any action of the Commissioners of
the Land Office, for under the law I am not in a position where
I would have any right to deal with the merits of any application
before them. It is simply my desire that, as they have full
authority in the premises and the Governor has no proper rela-
tion to the matter, they shall provide independently of the Gov-




On motion, the matter was referred to the Attorney-General,
who on December 23, 1907, rendered the opinion above referred
to (Id. 234). The questions still remain, did they make proper
provision for the "suitable execution of the grants upon which
they decide" and are the grants executed by the Governor before
1907 valid?
Charles G. Stevenson.
New York.
